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NYQUIST AND PUBLIC AID TO PRIVATE
EDUCATION
VICTOR J. PIEKARSKI*

The latest Supreme Court decisions involving an application of
the religion clauses of the first amendment to state statutes, may
serve to foreclose any further attempts by a state to aid parochial
schools. The cases concerned the validity of two New York statutes' and one of Pennsylvania. 2 In Levitt v. Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty,3 the Court struck down New
York's grant for reimbursing nonpublic schools for expenses related to testing and reporting required by the state, as a violation
of the establishment clause. In Sloan v. Lemon,4 it found Pennsylvania's parent reimbursement plan similarly violative. And finally,
in the most detailed and most important opinion of the three,
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist,5 the Court held New York's package of reimbursement
for maintenance and repair expenses, reimbursement of tuition
expenses, and its tax credit for tuition expenses unconstitutional
* B.A. 1971, Boston College; J.D. 1974, Northwestern University Law School; associated with the law firm of Querrey, Harrow, Gulanick & Kennedy, Ltd., Chicago, Illinois;
member of the Illinois Bar.
I. N.Y. Laws, 1970, ch. 138 § 2, provided for reimbursing nonpublic schools throughout
the state for
. . . expenses of services for examination and inspection in connection with administration, grading, and the compiling and reporting of the results of tests and examinations, maintenance of records of pupil enrollment and reporting thereon, maintenance of public health records, recording of personnel qualifications and characteristics, and the preparation and submission to the state of various other reports as
provided for or required by law or regulation.
The second New York statute provided for three distinct aid programs: N. Y. Laws,
1972, ch. 414 § 1, amending N. Y. EDuc. LAW, art. 12 §§ 549-553 (McKinney Supp. 1972)
provided for direct money grants to nonpublic schools for "maintenance" expenses; N. Y.
Laws, 1972, ch. 414 § 2, amending N. Y. EDuc. LAW, art. 12-A § 559-563 (McKinney Supp.
1972) created a limited tuition reimbursement program for parents of parochial school
children who earned less than $5,000.00; and N. Y. Laws, 1972, ch. 414 §§ 3, 4 and 5
amending N. Y. TAX LAW, §§ 612(c), 612(j)(McKinney Supp. 1972) which provided for tax
credits for tuition paid to parochial schools by parents not eligible for the reimbursement
program and earning less than $25,000.00 per annum.
2. "Parent Reimbursement Act for Nonpublic Education." Law of Pa., 1971, act 92,
24 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5701-5709 (Supp. 1972), creating a reimbursement program similar
to New York's.
3. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
4. 413 U.S. 825 (1973).
5. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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since all three aspects were found to have "a primary effect that
advances religion." 6 The scope and variety of these latest plans,
coupled with those which had gone before, 7 seem to run the gamut
of legislative options which aim at finding a way to constitutionally
aid nonpublic schools. States may provide bus transportation 8 and
books,9 but precious little else. 10 The Supreme Court has so held;
but is such a result necessary? Does the first amendment command
the states to stand by, the hands holding the legislative purse
strings bound by the cords of judicial opinions, and watch the
decline of an alternative system of education and the concommitant increase in demands made upon an already overburdened state
school system? Hopefully not. The answer lies not, however, in the
inventiveness and ingenuity of new legislative schemes, but in a reevaluation by the Supreme Court of its various criteria for finding
state plans either constitutional or forbidden. The aim of this article is to suggest a new test which would satisfy both the commands
of the religion clauses of the First Amendment and the demands
of proponents of state aid to parochial schools.
The background of the Nyquist case can be quickly summarized. Soon after the New York aid package became law, it was
challenged in federal court by the Committee for Public Education
and Religious Liberty, an unincorporated association, and several
individual residents and taxpayers of New York. A three-judge
court was convened and the case was decided without an evidentiary hearing. The district court found the maintenance and repair
provisions, and the tuition reimbursement provisions unconstitutional, but upheld the tax credit scheme."
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, found all
three aspects unconstitutional as violative of the establishment
clause. The maintenance and repair provisions fell because their
2
effect was to subsidize the religious mission of sectarian schools
since no attempt was made "to restrict payemnts to those expenditures related to the upkeep of facilities used exclusively for secular
6. Id. at 774.
7. Specifically those involved in Lemon v. Kurtzman and Earley v. DiCenso, 403 U.S.
602 (1971).
8. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
9. Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
10. Aid may constitutionally take the form of "public provision of police and fire
protection, sewage facilities, and streets and sidewalks." Id. at 242.
Or, a church may be given a tax exemption. Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664 (1969).
II. 413 U.S. at 768-769.
12. Id. at 779-780.
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purposes."' 3 The other two portions of the scheme were struck
down for similar reasons.' 4 The Chief Justice, and Justices White
and Rehnquist, dissented in separate opinions, finding both the
tuition reimbursement and tax credit portions of the statute unobjectionable.
Before beginning his examination of the three plans contained
in the statute, Justice Powell reviewed the purpose and aim of the
religion clauses, the standard they require, and the test fashioned
by the Supreme Court in previous cases in order to assure that the
standard had been met. In his view, the establishment clause protects against the evils of "sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."' 5 Later, he
states that "our cases require the State to maintain an attitude of
'neutrality,' neither 'advancing' or 'inhibiting' religion. '"' The test
he would apply is also expressly set out: "[F]irst, [the statute] must
reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose. . . second, must have
a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . .
and third, must avoid excessive government entanglement with
religion.' 7 None of these expressions of purpose, standard, and
criteria are new. Rather, they have been evolved through judicial
interpretation of the establishment clause since 1946. An understanding of these earlier cases is necessary in order to fully appreciate the import of the above three statements. It is also necessary
in order to fully elucidate those aspects of the opinion which, in
this author's view, should be abandoned, and those alternative
criteria which will be submitted later as replacements.
I. THE CASES
The first amendment commands that "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." The first major test of state aid to nonpublic
schools as violative of the first amendment was considered Everson
8 A state plan to reimburse
v. Board of Education."
parents of all
children for the cost of bus transportation to and from school was
challenged as a law "respecting an establishment of religion" since
13. Id. at 774.
14. The Court held that they subsidized the religious mission of the school since no
attempt was made to distinguish its secular and religious functions.
15. 413 U.S. at 772, citing Walz, supra, note 10.
16. Id. at 788.
17. Id. at 773.
18. 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
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the plan reached parents of children in church-related schools.
After reviewing the history of the adoption of the first amendment, 9 Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, held that the
establishment clause meant at least this:
Neither a state or the Federal Government can set up a Church.
Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force or influence a person to go or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups or vice versa. In the words of Jefferson,
the clause against establishment of religion was intended to erect
"a wall of separation between Church and State." 0
Black then continued to describe not only what New Jersey could
not do because of the establishment clause, but also what it could
not do because of the free exercise clause."' The upshot of this is
"[T]hat the Amendment requires the state to be neutral in its
relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it
does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no
more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor
them. ' 22 Although the majority found this plan to be on the
"verge" of an establishment, they held it to be constitutional since
the beneficiaries were school children and not parochial schools
19. Some authorities have viewed Black's version of constitutional history as rather
biased, if not totally erroneous. "Undoubtedly the Court has the right to make history, as
it has often done in the past; but it has no right to make it up." Corwin, The Supreme Court
as National School Board, 14 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1949).
20. 330 U.S. at 18.
21. New Jersey cannot consistently with the "establishment of religion" clause
of the First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution
which teaches the tenets and faith of any church. On the other hand, other language
of the amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free
exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics,
Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or the lack of it, from
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.
Id. at 16.
22. Id. at 18.
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directly, and because this was seen as "public welfare legisla-

tion .'23
The most important aspect of the case is, of course, the application of the establishment clause to the states. Although there were
some statements in earlier cases which indicated that the first
amendment was made applicable to the states by the fourteenth's
guarantee of "liberty", these cases concerned free exercise and not
establishment problems .24 Yet, Justice Black felt no need to explain

or justify this new incorporation.2 However, the question has, for
all practical purposes, been mooted, and any argument either
against or supportive of parochaid must perforce accept this as a
26
given fact.
The next two cases to reach the Supreme Court involved programs of "released time." In McCollum v. Board of Education,7

the Illinois program of allowing religion classes to be held in public
schools at certain hours during the school day, was struck down
as unconstitutional. The Court found that "[T]he state. . . affords
sectarian groups an invaluable aid in that it helps to provide pupils
for their religious classes through use of the State's compulsory
public school machinery. This is not separation of Church and
State. ' 12 8 Although the plan provided that attendance at these
classes was voluntary, the Court saw an element of coercion. Mr.

Justice Frankfurter put it most strongly in his concurring opinion:
"The Champaign arrangement thus presents powerful elements of
23. Id.
24. "The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such
laws." Cantwell v. Conn., 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1937). That case concerned a violation of a
criminal statute which prohibited soliciting without a license. The defendant was a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses. The Court held the statute unconstitutional as infringing
upon free exercise of religion.
25. On the issue of incorporation without disagreement, Kauper offers this explanation:
"The only satisfactory explanation is that they impliedly accepted the proposition that the
establishment clause embodies one of those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.' Palko v. Conn., 302 U.S.
319, 328 (1937)." Kauper, Everson v. Board of Education: A Product of the Judicial Will,
15 ARIZ. L. REv. 307 (1973). Mr. Justice Roberts said as much in Cantwell: "The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in the [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment." 310 U.S. at 303.
26. Challenges to the incorporation of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth would,
in the words of Justice Clark, "seem entirely untenable and of value only as academic
exercises." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 217 (1962).
27. 333 U.S. 203 (1947).
28. Id. at 212.
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inherent pressure by the school system in the interests of religious
sects. . . .The law of imitation operates, and non-conformity is
not an outstanding characteristic of children. The result is an obvious pressure upon children to attend." 9 The second case involv-3
ing a similar released time program was Zorach v. Clauson. 1
There, the children who wished to attend religious instruction were
released from school and went to places other than public schools.
The non-participants remained in school until the end of the school
day. Mr. Justice Douglas, after acknowledging that "[T]he First
Amendment does not say that in every and in all respects there
shall be a separation of Church and State," 3' found the plan constitutionally sound. The majority found no elements of coercion
present here32 as in McCollum. The dissenters saw the facts differ33
ently on this point.
The next pair of cases, unlike McCollum and Zorach which
involved relationships between public schools and religious groups,
had to do with activities solely within the public school. Engel v.
Vitale3 4 involved the "Regent's Prayer" which was to be read
aloud each day in public schools. A child could be excused upon
parental request. After pointing out the danger of a governmentsponsored prayer to free exercise guarantees,3 Justice Black distinguished the force of both clauses:
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does
not depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion
and is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws
operate directly to coerce non36
observing individuals or not.
Yet, shortly thereafter, he states that: "When the power, prestige
and financial support of the government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
29. Id. at 227.
30. 343 U.S. 306 (1951).
31. Id. at 312.
32. If there had been evidence of coercion, Justice Douglas recognized that "a wholly
different case would be presented." Id. at 311.
33. "This released time program is founded upon a use of the State's power of coercion,
which for me, determines its unconstitutionality." Id. at 323. Opinion of Justice Jackson
(dissenting).
34. 370 U.S. 421 (1961).
35. ". . . [O]ne of the greatest dangers to the freedom of the individual to worship in
his own way lay in the governments' placing its official stamp of approval upon one particular kind of prayer or on one particular form of religious services." Id. at 429.
36. Id. at 430.
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minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion
is plain.""7 The Court found an impermissible establishment and
struck it down.
Abington School District v. Schempp 8 involved Bible reading
in public schools with the same opportunity for students to be
excused as in Engel. After citing the possible existence of a coercive
element,391 Justice Clark stated the test to be applied in establishment cases: "[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the
enactment.

.

. "[T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment

Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."" The Court
found the practice to be a "religious exercise, required by the
States in violation of the command of the First Amendment that
the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding or opposing religion."'"
The next case returned attention to plans providing state aid to
nonpublic schools. In Board of Education v. Allen,4" a New York
law provided for the loaning of books to students in private, as well
as public, schools, to be used in the courses offered in those
schools. A similar plan had been before the Supreme Court before
Everson was decided, but the issues presented involved questions
of due process and not establishment of religion.43 The Court
analogized it to the situation present in Everson-public welfare
legislation benefiting children and only indirectly benefiting religious institutions.44 The Court applied the Schempp test 45 and upheld the plan.
The next major step in the evolution of the criteria against
which state plans which attempted to aid religion were to be measured, came in a tax case, Walz v. Tax Comm." The case involved
a tax exemption for property used solely for religious purposes.
37. Id. at 431.
38. 374 U.S. 203 (1962).
39. One allegation of the complaint stated that the practice violated petitioners' freedom
of religion "in that it threatens their religious liberty by placing a premium on belief as
against non-belief and subjects their freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority." Id.
at 212.
40. Id. at 222.
41. Id. at 225.
42. 392 U.S. 236 (1961).
43. Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
44. 392 U.S. at 244.
45. Id. at 243.
46. 397 U.S. 664 (1969).
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Mr. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority reviewed the
purposes of the establishment and free exercise clauses. He said
that for the founding fathers, the establishment of religion "connoted sponsorship, financial support and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity." 47 He held the thrust of both clauses
was, and is, "benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference. 48 The
case is important not for the Chief Justice's interpretation of the
first amendment, however, but for the rather summary addition of
a third testing criterion-whether or not the end result of the legislation created an excessive government entanglement with religion.49
This third test was enough to strike down the state plans considered in Lemon v. Kurtzman and the companion case of Early
v. DiCenso, Nyquist's immediate prodecessors.50 Both plans provided that the state would bear some of the costs of secular education provided by nonpublic schools. The Rhode Island statute
provided a salary supplement to teachers in private schools."' The
Pennsylvania statute authorized the "purchase" of "secular educational services" from nonpublic schools. Under this arrangement,
the state directly reimbursed nonpublic schools solely for their
actual expenditures for teachers' salaries, books, and instructional
materials.5 2 After stating the three-pronged test gleaned from its
previous cases,53 the Court, after finding it unnecessary to decide
the primary effect of the statutes, held both unconstitutional under
the entanglements test.54 The Court also noted the further defect
in the Pennsylvania plan of directly reimbursing the private
schools,55 thus distinguishing it from Everson and Allen. Finally,
the Chief Justice noted that: "As well as constituting an independent evil against which the Religion Clauses were intended to protect, involvement or entanglement between government and reli47. Id. at 668.
48. Id. at 669.
49. Id. at 674.
50. 403 U.S. 602 (1970).
51. Id. at 607.
52. Id. at 609.
53. "First the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances or inhibits religion . . . finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion'." Id. at 612-613.
54. Id. at 614.
55. Id. at 621.
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gion serves as a warning signal," 56 indicating that entanglements
may be a sign of incipient establishment.
II. THE THEORIES
From these cases a number of theories as to what is permissible
under the establishment clause have been drawn. A number of
them are no longer tenable in light of Nyquist and some have never
found acceptance in the Supreme Court. But they are valuable
nonetheless if only because their wreckage marks the sites of otherwise hidden barriers.
A.

The Absolutes
The first two theories can be called the "absolutes." Theory one
is that any aid is forbidden- "no law respecting an establishment
of religion" means exactly that.5 7 This is what Black seemed to be
talking about in Everson, but in the end he does find a safe area
in which the state can act." The previously cited statement of
Justice Douglas in Zorach would seem to put an end to this line
of argument once and for all.59
Theory two anchors itself to the case of Sherbert v. Verner,"0
the position being that aid to parochial schools is required. Since
the government in Sherbert could not pressure a citizen into foregoing religious belief by imposing an economic penalty upon the
exercise of that belief,"1 it cannot do so in the private school situation. The government must allocate school funds between public
and private schools, otherwise the burden of supporting two systems falls exclusively upon those who send their children to parochial schools for religious reasons. This is tantamount to imposing an economic burden on the exercise of their religious beliefs
and therefore a violation of their rights to free exercise.12 The
56. Id. at 624-625.
57. Griswold calls this approach "Fundamental Theological." Using this line of approach, "the judge puts on blinders. He looks at one phrase only; he blinds himself to
everything else." Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark, 8 UTAH L. REv. 167, 169 (1963).
58. Prompting this reproach from Mr. Justice Jackson in dissent: "The case which
irresistably comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who, according to
Byron's reports, whispering 'I ne'er will consent,"-consented.'" 330 U.S. at 19.
59. "The First Amendment does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a
separation of Church and State." 343 U.S. at 312.
60. 374 U.S. 398 (1962).
61. Id. at 404.
62. A more subtle argument was suggested in a student note: "State aid to parochial
schools is necessary to guard people's free exercise of religion. To refuse aid to churchrelated schools, given their current financial problems, would be akin to enacting a law that
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problems with this approach are twofold: first, it overlooks the
aspect of voluntariness in the choice of school situation and the
rather coercive situation which existed in Sherbert; secondly, and
most importantly, it completely ignores the establishment clause.
It has never been accepted by the Supreme Court and never will
be, simply because it has the effect of writing the establishment
clause out of the first amendment.
B. Separation
The next level is occupied by what may be called the "separation" theories. They are based on the premise that government can
do nothing which aids or supports religion directly." These theories encompass the extremes marked at one end of the spectrum
by Jefferson's "wall" and at the other by Choper's theory that the
establishment clause does not prohibit aid to the extent that parochial schools perform secular services, since as long as the government gets its money's worth, the nature of the supplying institution
should make no difference. 4
1. The Wall of Separation
The idea of a "wall of separation between Church and State"
is as iffiportant a metaphor as it is unfortunate. The ideal it describes is difficult to challenge yet equally difficult to meet, given
the fact that in numerous areas, education being one, the interests
of state are similar to the interests of churches. The decision that
a state can not constitutionally require all students to attend public
schools,65 would seem to make total separation impossible. But the
Court struggled with this seeming paradox" in its earlier cases. In
fact, Justice Jackson's reference to Byron's Julia 7 emphatically
points out this inconsistency. From this struggle has emerged a
all children must attend public schools, and that has already been declared constitutionally
impermissible by the Supreme Court." 17 CATH. L. REV. 242 (1971).
63. Note, New York State's Textbook Loan Law, 18 BUFF. L. REV. 356, 359 (1969).
64. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to ParochialSchools, 56 CAL. L. RaV.
260 (1968).
65. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
66. This paradox exists only if Jefferson's metaphor is read literally. It has been suggested elsewhere that "separation of Church and State is not an independent principle, that
the primary principle is that of religious liberty-protected from government action either
establishing religion or prohibiting its free exercise. These protections are conveniently
summarized in the phrase 'separation of church and state.'" Katz, Freedom of Religion
and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 426, 428 (1953).
67. See note 58, supra.
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number of theories which, for the -sake of convenience, may be
described as exceptions to the total separation ideal.
2.

Child Benefit
The first of these exceptions was suggested in Everson, and has
generally come to be known as the Child Benefit theory.8 The
reasoning is that although it is impermissible for a state to aid
religion, it is not impermissible for it to enact measures tending to
benefit a class of citizens, here children, some of whom may be
attending parochial schools."9 Similar reasoning was applied in
Allen and sufficient to sustain the book-loan plan under the primary purpose and effect test employed by the Court in that case.7"
But the theory has not had an easy history and it appears that upon
closer inspection the fact that a third party is aided along with the
school should have no constitutional significance. 71 Accepting, for
the moment, the first two of the Court's criteria, it would seem that
child-benefit may be a valid secular legislative purpose. However,
the theory cannot, of its own force excuse a failure under the effect
test if, in fact, the primary effect of the legislation was to aid
religion. The constitutionality of state aid programs should not rest
upon whether or not the legislature could efficiently, or at least
practicably, channel the aid through a third party. This position is
adopted by the Court in Nyquist in striking down the tuition and
tax credit plans and would seem to foreclose any future argument
that the existence of an unconstitutional establishment depends
upon whether the aid is direct or indirect. The question now is
simply stated: Is the aid given impermissible?
3. Education-Welfare Distinction
After Everson and Schempp, the thrust of the arguments
shifted from the broad issue of aid or no aid to whether aid to the
"process" of education was permissible. Opponents of aid began
68. Mr. Justice Black found the New Jersey statute to be "public welfare legislation,"
which would help to maintain the health and safety of all children on their way to school.
330 U.S. at 16-17.
69. "Direct aid to church-related institutions would be impermissible while aid to students would be permissible, because any aid channeled to the school through student subsidies would be indirect." Valente, Aid to Church Related Education-New Directions Without Dogma, 55 VA. L. REv. 579, 590-591 (1969).
70. 392 U.S. at 243.
71. "[T]he sharp dichotomy between pupil benefit and benefit to the school seems to
me a chimerical constitutional criterion.
Freund, Public Aid to ParochialSchools,
82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1685 (1965).
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with the proposition that a "parochial school's education is so
'permeated' with its own sectarian teachings and ideals that (its
proselytyzing function) cannot be separated from its secular educational function. 7 2 Since aid to sectarian education would therefore
be aid to religion, any state grants which were aimed at promoting
the educational function, as opposed to strictly public welfare legis-

lation, should be prohibited.13 The Court in Allen rejected this
approach stating that it "had long recognized that religious schools
pursue two goals, religious instruction and secular education. 7 4
The "permeation" theory resurfaced again in Lemon and in Tilton
v. Richardson,75 in part causing divergent holdings in the two cases.
Various authors have tried to reconcile these seemingly inconsistent holdings on the theory that the nature of the institution benefited determines the constitutionality of the aid. 76 This theory is in
accord with the Court's statement in Nyquist that "[N]o attempt
is made to restrict the payments to those expenditures related to
the upkeep of facilities used exclusively for secular purposes, nor
do we think it possible within the context of these religion oriented

institutions to impose such restrictions. ' 77 The Court also made it
clear that the existence of a conduit is unimportant if the nature
of the ultimate beneficiary is "permeated" with religion by striking
down the second and third parts of the New York plan.
72. Note, Aid to Parochialand PrivateSchools, 15 VILL. L. REv. 477, 484 (1970).
73. See, Rosenfield, Separationof Church and State in the Public Schools, 22 U. PrrT.
L. REv. 561 (1971).
Auxiliary services that are essential aids to the function of education as such (e.g.
textbooks and school transportation) cannot constitutionally be provided where the
education is religious, since the function thus becomes religious education . . .
where, however, the auxiliary services are provided to children as children, in aid of
a public function, and unrelated either to schooling or to religious purposes or
religious functions (e.g. fire and police protection, health programs, lunch programs)
they are not subject to the interdiction of the First Amendment.
Id. at 580.
74. 392 U.S. at 244.
75. 403 U.S. 672 (1971). In that case the Court upheld direct grants to three sectarian
universities. The Court held that they were not so "permeated" that aid to them would be
tantamount to aid to their religious sponsors. The Court also found that the direct grants
did not foster excessive entanglement between church and state.
76. See, e.g., Kauper, Public Aid for Parochial Schools and Church Colleges: The
Lemon, DiCenso and Tilton Cases, 13, ARZ. L. REV. 567 (1972).
77. 413 U.S. at 774.
78. Id. at 780.
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4.

Function Aided Approach
The Court's Nyquist opinion79 would seem to have put an end
to a third theory supporting aid to nonpublic schools. After the
Allen Court recognized the dual-education aspect of parochial
schools, legislatures attempted to subsidize only the purely secular
function of private schools. 0 The theory was that "[I]f one assumes
that the religious schools meet the state's standards for education
in secular subjects, it is not aid to religion to apply tax funds
toward the cost of such education in public and private schools
without discrimination."'" The doctrinal ancestor of this approach
is Bradfield v. Roberts,'2 which upheld a federal grant to a Roman
Catholic hospital. The Court, in that case identified a secular purpose and found it separable from any religiously oriented activities.13 This approach failed in Lemon because the mechanism of
guaranteeing that the state funds would be used for secular purposes only created an excessive entanglement. A similar plan failed
in Levitt84 because of the absence of any restrictions on the use of
state funds. And so it would appear that any aid directed to a
"permeated" institution, irrespective of the presence or absence of
procedural safeguards, will be found unconstitutional under the
present tests.
5. Choper's-Quid Pro Quo
One final theory which can be viewed as an exception85 to "separation" was suggested by Professor Choper.86 It is his position
that:
Governmental financial aid may be extended directly or indirectly to support parochial schools without a violation of the
establishment clause so long as such aid does not exceed the value
of the secular educational service rendered by the school.8 7
79. Lemon avoided squarely facing the question by deciding on entanglement rather
than effect grounds.
80. See Valente, supra, note 69 at 593.
81. Katz, supra, note 66 at 440.
82. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
83. "It is simply the case of a secular corporation being managed by people who hold
to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church but who nevertheless are managing the
hospital corporation according to the laws under which it exists." Id. at 298-299.
84. See note 3,supra.
85. This is the proverbial exception that swallows up the rule.
86. See note 64, supra.
87. Id. at 265-266.
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If the establishment clause had never been the subject of a Jefferson letter this position would be hard to assail purely on the language of the first amendment. However, the Supreme Court has
held that the ideal is separation and the inquiry has been directed
as to how the various plans which have come under attack comport
with that ideal. A second stumbling block is the permeation
theory-the value of the secular educational service is impossible
of estimation, since, in the Court's view, the secular and sectarian
aspects cannot be distinguished.
C. Accommodation
Another theory rather limited in scope, easily distinguishable
from the "absolute" and "separation" approach, was suggested by
the holding in Zorach. The premise is that there are certain necessary relationships between church and state which have traditionally resulted in governmental "accommodation" of religious interests. One example would be an ordinance prohibiting excessive
noise in an area around a church on a Sunday morning. But it
could not be suggested that the state could "accommodate" a
religion by building it a church. Similarly, it would seem that this
theory would not be broad enough to support an "accommodation" or free exercise by paying for church schools. It is obvious
that this approach would sanction violations of the first amendment if it accommodates only organized religions as it did in
Zorach. It has the effect of balancing the first amendment claims
of the group challenging the alleged establishment agains the free
exercise interests of the group being accommodated. The Court has
held such a balance to be impermissible. The interests of the state
and the claims of the opponents of the state's action should be the
only relevant factors.
D. No Imposition
Another independent line of reasoning takes for its basis the
outermost rim of establishment clause protection, that the government may not force religious beliefs upon its citizens. From this
point, Professor Schwarz extrapolates what he terms a "no imposition" theory."9 In his view, "imposition" occurs when government
88. School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225-226 (1963).
89. Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment Clause Value, 77 YALE L.
J. 692 (1968).
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action or aid induces religious belief." He sees the standard as
freedom of religious choice and would allow aid which does not
ififuence one's choice of religion or non-religion." Under this view,
statutes like those found violative of the establishment clause in
cases like McCollum, Engel, and Schempp, and those upheld in
McGowan v. Maryland2 and Braunfeld v. Brown,'3 would be
unconstitutional in that they act directly upon the choice between
religion and non-religion. That is, they have a clear free exercise
overtone. Aid cases like Everson, Allen and Lemon which do not
involve coercive choice of belief or disbelief, but rathercoercive
support, would be held to be constitutionally permissible. The proposal, though quite attractive, compresses the protections of the
first amendment within the terms of the free exercise clause, leaving the establishment clause with little substance.
E. Neutrality
The last series of theories are the "neutrality" approaches. This
is the name that the Court has applied to its own fashion of interpreting the religion clauses. But first, two other "neutrality" theories should be examined. The first is an attempt to use the doctrine
affirmatively to argue that aid is mandatory." However, this
merely substitutes "neutrality demands" for "free exercise demands" in the absolutist approach discussed previously. The second approach is much more subtle in that it would allow, rather
than mandate, aid. The author of this theory, Professor Kurland,
sees the commands of the religion clauses as:
[I]mpossible of effectuation unless they are read together as creating a doctrine more akin to the reading of the equal protection
clause than to the due process clause; i.e. they must be read to
mean that religion may not be used as governmental action,
rights or privileges or
whether that action be the conferring of
5
the imposition of duties or obligations.1
90. Id. at 723.
91. Id. at 728.
92. 366 U.S. 420 (1960).
93. 366 U.S. 599 (1960).
94. This argument was stated, with apprehension, by Freund, supra, note 71 at 1682:
Arguing that the aid in the New York case (Allen) was sustained because it was
available neutrally to all students in accredited schools, the proponents are likely to
insist that such aid is not merely permissible but is mandatory, since the First

Amendment enforces just this standard of neutrality among religions and between a
religious and a secular promotion of a common public purpose.
95. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1961).
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All that would be necessary under this approach would be a secular
purpose broad enough to encompass aid to church related schools.
The flaw in the theory, however, is that it, like the child benefit
theory, carries the plan over the purpose hurdle but leaves it open
to attack under the Court's effect test. The theory has found some
support in Supreme Court opinions," but, given the state legislature's wide discrtion in defining its secular purpose, it would allow,
in its broadest interpretation, the protections of the establishment
clause to be overcome by the expedient of clever draftsmanship.
III.

THE COURT'S POSITION

A. The Standard
The Court's standard is also called "neutrality", but its essence
is difficult to grasp.97 Perhaps the only way of delineating its perimeters is by reviewing what has been allowed and what has been
prohibited in its name. Buses and books have been allowed, while
any form of prayer in public schools has been prohibited. A "released time" plan with classes held outside of the public school did
not violate the standard, while one holding classes in the public
schools did. Direct grants to elementary and secondary schools for
maintenance and repairs, for testing expenses, and for teachers'
salaries were unconstitutional under the standard, as were tax
credit and reimbursement of tuition plans, but a direct federal
grant to a church related university to increase its physical plant
was not. Under the Court's standard, the channel of aid, whether
it be direct or indirect, is immaterial; as is whether the function
aided is educational or viewed as "public welfare." About all that
can be gleaned from the various opinions as to what will be permitted is that:
• . . [A]id to sectarian educational institutions [is] constitutionally permissible provided that three precedent conditions are satisfied: (a) the primary mission of the school is secular education
rather than religious training; (b) the aid given prossesses inher96. See Opinion of Justice Harlan concurring in Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236 (1968). Contra, Opinion of Justice Douglas dissenting in Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S.
664 (1969).
97. Perhaps this statement can best serve to illustrate the Court's rather amorphous
standard: "Neutrality, a combination of cooperation, indifference, and accommodation,
was adopted, forming the principle that state power should be used to handicap or favor
religion. This undefinable term is constantly repeated and reused throughout later cases."
Wedlock and Jasper, Parochaidand the First Amendment: Past, Present and Future, 2 J.
LAW & ED. 377 (1973).
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ent religious neutrality easily ascertained and controlled; and (c)
such aid does not require complex regulation and auditing procedures on a perpetual basis. 8
Assuming that, in most cases, the aid is money and that it possesses
inherent religious neutrality, constitutionality depends, under the
Court's standard, upon the nature of the institution benefited and
upon the form of the aid. This result is mandated by the tests
employed by the Court in effectuating their neutrality standard.
B. The Tests
The excessive entanglements test makes the form of the aid,
and to a lesser extent, the nature of the institution benefited, of
particular constitutional significance. It is because of this test that
aid like that proposed in Nyquist or Lemon can never pass constitutional muster. In Nyquist, the test was not applied; the fault of
the legislation was that it failed to provide safeguards that would
prevent government funds from being used to aid religion. However, can it be doubted that, if such safeguards were present, the
legislation would meet the same fate as the plan in Lemon? The
entanglements test completely closes the circle-aid is prohibited
unless there is some guarantee that it will be used only for secular
purposes; to ensure this, the legislature must provide safeguards;
but if these safeguards must necessarily entangle state machinery
with the workings of a religious institution, the aid is still violative.99 It has been suggested that the excessive entanglements test
be abandoned. The arguments against its application are many.
One commentator suggests that it is not a question of degree, but
rather, of the primary effect of entanglement. To illustrate his
point, he compares the entanglement occasioned by compulsory
school attendance laws and finds the enforcement of these laws
permissible because its primary effect is not the advancement or
inhibition of religion and not because it fosters less than excessive
entanglements."' A second commentator sees the excessive entanglements test as a product of a no-assistance viewpoint, and finds
it vague in that the Court has failed to define the dividing line
between permissible governmental entanglement and excessive en98. Martin, Parochial School Aid-From Allen to Lemon to Tilton, 3 SEaON HALL L.
REV. 61, 79 (1971).
99. Fahy, The Sacred Wall Revisited, 67 Nw. L. REv. 118, 143 (1972).
100. Cunningham, Lemon v. Kurtzman: First Amendment Religion Clauses
Reexamined, 33 U. PiT. L. REV. 330, 338-339 (1971).
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tanglement.' 0 Finally, it has been viewed by a third author as
"[H]erald[ing] a significant decline in the neutrality standard."'' °
These criticisms of the Court's newest test make for a strong argument against its retention, but one more argument in favor of
abandoning it can be mounted. Looking again to the comparable
entanglements fostered by the enforcement of a compulsory school
attendance law, it is obvious that the purpose which the entanglement seeks to vindicate is one that is clearly secular. If the excessiveness of the entanglement is determined by the purpose mandating it, then it would seem that the inquiry should be directed at the
legislative purpose; yet, this is the one criterion which the Court
has, rather cavalierly, found to be satisfied by the statutes challenged in both Lemon and Nyquist. But, abandoning the entanglements test would still fail to save the legislation found unconstitutional in Nyquist, given Justice Powell's statement that it was
impossible to separate the secular and religious functions of the
schools in question.' 3 With this being so, any amount of restrictions, or in other words entanglements, would not be sufficient to
guard against the use of the money to aid the religious mission of
the schools. Given the Court's acceptance of the permeation
theory, without a full evidentiary record, ' and its place in the
Court's test, the only alternative available for the proponents of aid
to nonpublic schools would be to convince the Court to adopt new
testing criteria. What these alternative tests should be will be dealt
with in the remainder of this article.

IV.

THE NEW TESTS

The question to which any test must provide an answer is

whether or not the state has enacted a law establishing a religion.
It is submitted that in order to answer this question, it must first
be known when the right to be free from establishment has been

transgressed. Since that right is incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause, there must be a deprivation of
either "liberty" or "property" for that right to be violated. There
is an invalid establishment of religion either because the legislation

impairs the free exercise rights of the complainant or because it is
101. Hartman, Government Assistance to Church-SponsoredSchools, 23 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 113 (1972).

102. Kauper, supra, note 76 at 583.
103. 413 U.S. at 774.
104. See note 4, supra.
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a substantial diversion of state tax-raised funds in aid of religion."°5
The tests, then, under a neutrality theory like that accepted by the
Court, should be aimed at these two factors. The more difficult
question is the second and so will be considered first. The argument
in support of aid would be that:
A school is an educational institution and not a church if its
object is intellectual development and if it is engaged, bona fide,
in this task. The fact that it is owned by a church or that it gives
some religious instruction or that its teaching is 'permeated' by
religion or that aid to it is incidentally of some benefit to the
Church, is immaterial. . . .The over-riding public purpose...
[is]. . .to improve education, including education in institutions
under religious auspices." 6
If it is recognized at the outset that church-related schools are
"permeated"'' 1 7 with such a degree of religiosity that any aid will
have the effect of benefiting religion to some extent, the question
would be whether the stated, and unstated, purposes of the legislation are sufficiently secular and sufficiently beneficial to the state
to overcome any objections on establishment grounds. The questions of permeation, or channel of aid, or whether it is public
welfare legislation, would be mooted, leaving only the issue of the
validity of the legislative judgment. If there is found, upon a balance between the factors which uphold the legislative action, that
is, the underlying reasons for the enactment (which may include
such things as public welfare aims) and the establishment claims,
that there is a valid overriding legislative purpose, the inquiry
should end there. However, if the statute also tends to restrict
religious liberty, or, as Schwarz would say, tends to impose upon
religious choice, the legislative purpose must also be balanced with
the effect of the statute upon the right of free exercise. The advantage of these tests over those used by the Court are fourfold: first,
they focus the issue by eliminating irrelevant, extraneous materials
such as questions concerning the form of aid, permeation, the
105. See Corwin, supra, note 19; and Kauper, Church, State and Freedom:A Review,
52 MICH. L. REv. 829 (1954).
106. Hutchins, The Future of the Wall, THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (D.
Oaks. ed. 1963).
107. "Permeation" is an argument against aid; by stipulating to the fact that church
schools are permeated, proponents of aid are merely recognizing that the Court would
probably come to that conclusion anyway. Opponents of aid could not complain of the
Court and the state legislature taking notice of this fact, since it has been the thrust of
their argument since the Allen decision.
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nature of the institution, etc., some of which the Court itself
abandoned, sub silentio, in Nyquist. Second, they elevate the purpose criterion from the level of token inquiry to the level of a fullblown constitutional test more in keeping with what the Court says
it is doing already, and along the lines of Kurland's neutrality
formulations. Third, they separate the deprivation of "property"
aspects from the "liberty" questions. Finally, they are adaptable
to questions arising under both clauses, a matter how quite impossible because of the existence of the entanglements test, but merely
a return to the position taken by the Court before Walz.
Whether the application of these tests would have the effect of
finding the plans in Nyquist, especially the maintenance and repair
provisions, constitutional is hard to gauge since the Court held not
only that there was an overriding and valid secular legislative purpose, behind the legislation, but also that there was an overriding
establishment claim. Under the new test, both findings would have
to be supported by a record whereas the Court in Nyquist assumed
their existence. But if these new tests were to be applied to the facts
in some of the earlier cases, the results are rather easy to predict.
The prayer cases, Schempp and Engel, would be subjected to both
tests and most certainly fail under the second since both involved
what was tantamount to religious instruction in public school. The
results in the released time cases, McCollum and Zorach, would
at least be consistent since the purpose in both is the same, and
because the establishment and free exercise claims in both would
also be the same. Both could conceivably fall since the legislative
purpose was, at most, merely an accommodation of organized
religion, a purpose which should easily be invalidated by a claim
flowing from either clause of the first amendment, since the accommodation benefits only organized churches, not religious beliefs
across the board. Everson and Allen would yield the same results
as before, since in both cases, the Court did make comparatively
detailed findings as to purpose (as opposed to Lemon and Nyquist)
and an attack, based upon a diversion of government funds in aid
of religion, would be difficult to sustain under the new test given
the existence of these findings.
V.

CONCLUSION

Whether these new tests are ever accepted by the Supreme
Court is of little moment, since their greatest value would be in
tidying up a rather unclear situation by exorcising the chaff of form
in its myriad varieties, from the wheat of substance. The Court is
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correct in interpreting the first amendment religion clauses as mandating neutrality, any other interpretation would serve to exalt one
clause at the expense of the other. It is also correct in its view that
a balancing test is the only really effective means of safeguarding
this neutrality. Obviously, the results produced by balancing will
not satisfy one side since the balance shifts as each person uses the
scale and determines the weight of each factor which must be
considered. However, this cannot justify the Court's retention of
the excessive entanglements test which represents merely the
weight of a judicial finger surreptitiously applied. The test should
either be abandoned for the reasons suggested above, or the Court
should flatly state that entanglement is establishment. Although
any alternative adopted by the Court will, in all probability, not
end attempts to aid nonpublic schools or the litigation aimed at
preventing such aid, it would at least serve to polarize one factor
in an area plagued by uncertainty and disagreement.

